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Zero Knowledge Games 
Ian Malloy 
Abstract: 
Zero-knowledge strategies as a form of inference and reasoning operate using the concept of 
zero-knowledge signaling, such that any imperfect recall or incomplete information can be 
attenuated for.  The resulting effect of structuring a continuous game within a zero-knowledge 
strategy demonstrates the ability to infer, within acceptable probabilities, which approximate 
stage a player is in.  This occurs only when an uninformed player attempts non-revealing 
strategies, resulting in a higher probability of failing to appear informed.  Thus, an opposing 
player understanding their opponent is uninformed can choose a more optimal strategy.  In cases 
where an informed player chooses a non-revealing strategy, introducing a hedge algebra as a 
doxastic heuristic informs feasibility levels of trust.  A counter strategy employing such a hedge 
algebra facilitates optimal outcomes for both players, provided the trust is well placed.  Given 
indefinite, finite sub-games leading to continued interactions based on trust, extensions to 
continuous games are feasible. 
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 Game theory and game-theoretic models are mathematical treatments of situations in 
which individuals or teams of individuals oppose or work with one another.  Badredine Arfi 
defines game theory as the study of information and linguistic mediums in strategic 
communications (Afri 2006).  John Nash, in turn, defines game theory as the potential for, and 
possibility of, communication and coalitions (Nash 1950).  In this work, game theory will 
assume both definitions by treating the model proposed as a refined approach to communicate 
strategically within coalitions and between opponents using zero-knowledge signaling and 
proofs.  In this manner, the core requirements Nash describes for non-cooperative games are 
adhered to.  No pre-play communication occurs within zero-knowledge games between 
competitive players and teams (Nash 1950).  This prevents coalitions and side payments from 
forming during the ex ante stage of games. 
 A further concept of Nash’s which is critical to the zero-knowledge model is the principle 
of “Mass-Action” defined by Nash, which states that players do not necessarily require complete 
knowledge of the total game structure, and the rationality of players is within feasible bounds 
such that no complex reasoning is required on the part of any agent (Nash 1950).  Players are 
expected, however, to possess rational capabilities to infer truths or beliefs relying on evidence 
presented or accumulated (Nash 1950). 
 By working under the assumption of the mass-action principle, it can be understood that 
mixed strategies as a model of average decisions and actions of players facilitates an equilibrium 
(Nash 1950).  By preventing any ex ante communications regarding the ex interim and ex post 
stages, any pure strategy will then be a product of probabilistic determinations regarding the 
opposing player’s strategy (Nash 1950).  By defining the zero-knowledge game as one relying on 
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probabilistic determinations regarding the opposing player’s strategy, as well as the expected 
outcome, the model then becomes one focusing on doxastic inference and epistemic judgments. 
 Per Nash the information, either epistemic or doxastic, will be imperfect and therefore 
always probabilistic.  The utility and stability of average frequencies are also functions of 
probability.  For unsolvable games, a heuristic to isolate equilibrium points may be used to 
deduce a sub-solution, which then becomes the solution of the unsolvable game.  Sub-solutions 
are known to act as a subdivision of equilibrium points within a game, occurring as a seemingly 
natural extension to the set of equilibrium points (Nash 1950). 
 In terms of non-cooperative and pure coordination games, the methodology will follow 
that of Nash where a cooperative game will be treated as a reduction of a non-cooperative form 
(Nash 1950).  This method facilitated Nash’s ability to find optimal solutions for two person 
cooperative games and restricted cases of some n-person games (Nash 1950).  Furthermore, the 
overarching context of this research shall remain that of facilitating equilibrium points such that 
for any finite or continuous non-cooperative game, the use of zero-knowledge signaling will 
either increase the discovery rate and execution of Nash equilibria, or facilitate the same for a 
sub-solution treated as equilibrium.  In this manner, even for games having no known solution 
the ability to employ zero-knowledge signaling assists players in achieving optimal outcomes for 
each player.  Given the findings of Gintis, the agreement theorem may be substituted for 
situations of multiplayer games, thus providing the solution of such games as a Nash equilibrium 
(Gintis 2009). 
Classical logic with binary truth values are replaced with a system of fuzzy logic, which 
relies on the notion of a wedge wherein the value of a given variable has as a truth-value a 
position along a continuum between wedges.  Arfi explains all considerations of inconsistency 
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compared to consistency within and between sets as relying on sharp differences of truth values 
associated with Boolean logic (Afri 2006).  Within the context of fuzzy logic, however, the 
concepts of consistency with respect to doxastic or epistemic partitions of knowledge are 
necessarily a degree of probability rather than a dichotomous, true, or false distinction (Afri 
2006).  Arfi’s formalism of a linguistic fuzzy logic game separates itself from notions of Boolean 
game models by structuring the game as one of fuzzy logic, with fuzzy logic serving as the 
foundation of strategic communication (Afri 2006).  Arfi explains that even with use of fuzzy 
logic, a fuzzy Nash equilibrium is similar in form to a conventional Nash equilibrium of classical 
logic games which maintain ordinal preferences (Afri 2006).  The use of fuzzy contexts in terms 
of decidability allows distinctions between evidence treated as a continuum when considering 
truth-values of contingent propositions. 
Doxastic, soft information held by a player is replaced with that of epistemic, hard information.  
Therefore, any belief or knowledge treated within a game is restricted entirely to that game.  By 
requiring a utility for any belief or knowledge, issues of discovering infinite beliefs or 
knowledge are avoided beyond the game itself.  Any belief or knowledge held by an agent must 
also be an element of the strategy set.  The domains of belief and knowledge must intersect the 
set of strategies or knowledge history of moves.  The strict congruence axiom is formalized as: 
 {𝑥 | 𝑥 ∈  𝐾 ∧  𝑥 ∈ 𝑆} ≡ { Φ(𝑥) ∈ 𝐾 } 
The operator Φ(𝑥) then states that 𝑥 is justifiable knowledge that 𝑥 is true, relative to strategic 
inference.  Continuous games are therefore preferred, given the increase in possible knowledge 
relative to multiple stages within a game. 
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Type-spaces are sets of which all elements are a function of belief.  The uncertainty of a 
given player is structured around conjectures of the opposing players’ strategy choices.  To 
resolve issues of logical omniscience, a distinction of universal validity and epistemic validity 
can be drawn.  Truth then becomes an ability to rationalize knowledge as that which can 
reasonably be known.  Θ(𝑥)(𝐸𝑥) and Φ(𝑥)(𝐸𝑥) are thus binary accessibility relations defined 
over common knowledge, such that the former represents universal consistency and the latter 
epistemic validity.  These operators have ordered relations with respect to variables, in addition 
to the domain and knowability of the token 𝐸𝑥. 
The strategies are elements of the set Π𝑖∈𝑁𝑆𝑖 with probability measures over a finite set 
𝑋, denoted ∆𝑋, representing the expected utilities given a strategy.  For a non-empty set Ω, there 
exists one element of the set wherein the state (𝜔 ∈ Ω) is true.  Deriving the notion of treating 
the state 𝜔 as the state of a given agent, the extension of this state to a doxastic projection of 
possible states the agent is in will be symbolized as ℎ(𝜔).  This is drawn from Jonathan Levin, 
who describes the state ℎ(𝜔) as an agent considering they are in ℎ(𝜔) when deciding from the 
actual state 𝜔 (Levin 2006).  To state that an agent knows 𝐸 is to first define the knowledge as 
Levin does, by treating it as a doxastic inference derived from a state believed possible by that 
agent (Levin 2006). 
Bayesian games attenuate the uncertainty of outcomes, with probabilistic inferences of 
opposing strategies being a primary concern.  The rule of such games is that all players choose 
rationally, which shall be defined by the boundary conditions of the theorem of synthetic 
alternation in addition to being restricted to instantiations of the theorem which follow directly 
from the axiomatic structure of the game.  Imperfect information attenuates previously made 
decisions of opponents by allowing a player to forget the move of the opponent.  Perfect recall 
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dictates that any move of a player is immediately available for recall at any time moving 
forward, for that specific player.  In addition to this, at any arbitrary time within the ex interim 
stage a player may not have hard information as to what stage that player is currently in.  In state 
diagram form for sequential moves, this is expressed as: 
 
 
Where Ω is a non-empty set of states and 𝑅𝑖 is a transitive Euclidean serial relation on 𝜔, 
with 𝑣 as a valuation function, we may treat 𝑣 as a fuzz valuation concerning the feasibility of an 
opposing player’s knowledge given a signal.  While knowledge has veracity, belief has 
consistency.  For a belief system challenged by knowledge introducing an inconsistency within 
the set of beliefs, the knowledge dominates.  With dominance of knowledge, the newly 
introduced information attenuates all previously held beliefs such that an equilibrium between 
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beliefs inconsistent with knowledge leads to a newly created consistency of adjusted beliefs.  
Information shall be partitioned as output generated by the generator function such that any 
partition of Ω, 𝜔 ∈ Ω has as an element ℎ(𝜔) which is the partition that contains 𝜔 (Levin 2006). 
Levin describes necessary conditions which must be satisfied in determining whether an 
information function is partitional (Levin 2006).  The properties for existence of information 
partitions per Levin (2006) are: 
P1: [𝜔 ∈ ℎ(𝜔)], for every 𝜔 ∈ Ω 
P2: If [𝜔′ ∈ ℎ(𝜔)], then [ℎ(𝜔′) = ℎ(𝜔)] 
Thus, the first property states an agent is unconvinced the state is not 𝜔, and the second property 
states that 𝜔′ is a doxastic consideration that the state 𝜔′ is also believed possible (Levin 2006).  
This then means that the set of possible states by comparison would have equal levels of doxastic 
trust that the agent is either in state 𝜔 or 𝜔′, provided the actual state is 𝜔′ (Levin 2006).  Levin 
defines a generator function of information with respect to the set of states Ω as the function ℎ 
which associates a non-empty subset ℎ(𝜔) with the states (𝜔 ∈ Ω) (Levin 2006).  Thus, each 
state (𝜔 ∈ Ω), treated by the associative function ℎ(𝜔) informs the agent of the relative state, 
analyzed first as the state which is possible at 𝜔.  The epistemic model 𝒦 will be defined as a 3-
tuple for agent 𝑖: 
𝒦 = 〈 Ω, {Π𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁, 𝜎 〉 
The knowledge function for a player 𝑖 is expressed by the power set of 𝑋, 𝓅(𝑥) which is 
constructed by an endomorphism of 𝐾𝑖: 𝓅(𝑥) → 𝓅(𝑥) such that 𝐾𝑖(𝐸) = {𝜔|Π𝑖(𝜔) ⊆ 𝐸} for the 
set 𝐾.  Knowledge is always universally consistent and necessarily incomplete.  As stated, for 
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knowledge inconsistent with the set of beliefs, produced by the endomorphism, the hard 
information always dominates the soft information.  This dominance of knowledge results in all 
soft information being reconstructed around the new requirements for consistency.  If knowledge 
pertaining to a subset of beliefs remains unknown, the subset of beliefs may adjust the belief 
elements of that subset such that probabilistic interpretations of information and events lead 
towards inconsistencies between the subset of beliefs and the set ℬ.  The belief function encodes 
evidence 𝐸 within the set of beliefs, ℬ of a player.  The process of encoding evidence is 
contingent upon a probabilistic threshold such that necessary conditions become sufficient, as 
justified by 𝐹.  The belief function and contingent requirements are expressed as the following 
equation: 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸) = {𝜔|𝐹 ∩ Π𝑖(𝜔) ⊆ 𝐸} 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸) encodes the belief 𝐸 for agent 𝑖 such that given 𝐹, belief that 𝐸 is true only holds when 𝐹 
reasonably justifies belief in E.  The endomorphism of the belief function with respect to 
knowledge is expressed as: 
𝐵𝑖: 𝓆(𝑥) → 𝓆(𝑥) 
Provided: 
 {𝓆(𝑥) ∈ 𝐵𝑖
𝐹|(𝐹 ∩ Π𝑖(𝜔) ⊆ 𝐸)} 
 We may then define a doxastic endomorphism as equivalent to 𝐵𝑖: 𝓆(𝑥) → 𝓆(𝑥), and the 
epistemic endomorphism defined as 𝐾𝑖: 𝓅(𝑥) → 𝓅(𝑥).  Thus, the probability measures with 
respect to the set of strategies and solutions may be treated as functional relations between 
knowledge and belief.  To approximate continuous games having indefinite, finite sub-games it 
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will be assumed that coalitions will for at some stage or another.  These coalitions should 
attenuate for situations when members who are uninformed attempt to deceive others within the 
same coalition.  This concept will be generalized to include members deceiving others across 
coalitions, and coalitions attempting the same as a unit acting against a competing coalition. 
“Everyone in group 𝐼 knows 𝐸” is formalized as an infinite conjunction between knowledge of 
an event 𝐸 for that player, or players acting in a cooperative frame.  The requirement for the 
event to be self-evident as noted by Levin (2006) further states that the event as a subset of states 
be self-evident, i.e. (𝜔 ∈ 𝐹 ⊂ 𝐸). 
𝐾𝐼(𝐸) ≔ ⋂ 𝐾𝑖(𝐸)
𝑖∈𝐼
 
Common knowledge extended from an agent to multiple agents remains defined as the infinite 
conjunction, but substitutes the single agent 𝑖 for 𝑛, where 𝑛 are the number of members within a 
given group: 
𝐾𝐼(𝐸) ≔ ⋂ 𝐾𝐼
𝑛(𝐸)
𝑛≥0
 
The same definition holds for a formal definition of common belief, by simply substituting 𝐾𝐼 
with 𝐵𝐼.  For 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 players, the epistemic model for common knowledge is the generator 
function 〈Ω, {Π𝑖∈𝑁}, 𝜎〉 for agent 𝑖.  This calls for self-evidence of 𝐸, provided 𝐸 ⊆ Ω and 𝐸 is 
self-evident for all players (Gintis 2009).  Gintis uses a K1 axiom in addition to the self-evidence 
of 𝐸, given 𝐸 is a subset of the states Ω (Gintis 2009).  The extension of (𝐸, 𝐹) both being public 
events, advances provided 𝐸 ∩ 𝐹 is also public (Gintis 2009).  Furthermore, when there exists a 
self-evident public event for an arbitrary number of states 𝜔 ∈ Ω there exists a minimal public 
event 𝑃∗(𝜔) which is then a resulting intersection of every event having 𝜔 as a member (Gintis 
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2009).  The result is a formal expression from Gintis, which then illustrates the intersection of all 
public events as described, symbolized as 𝑃∗
1𝜔 = ⋃ 𝑃𝑗𝑗∈𝑁 𝜔 (Gintis 2009). 
Public announcements are a function of truth and universality relative to claims which are 
accessible via common knowledge.  This type-space of doxastic conjectures regarding opposing 
players’ strategies can be expressed as a zero-knowledge proof.  A strict requirement, satisfied 
by zero-knowledge signaling, is that for a team of players of which one is publicly announcing 
information the opposing players and team must not know the information itself.  Epistemic 
validity, or lack thereof, which leads to an agent accepting a false proposition based on 
dishonesty necessarily leads to an unexpected outcome.  The misplaced trust in an opposing 
agent can potentially be avoided with a zero-knowledge strategy. 
 For any agent in a two-player finite game, the optimal strategy will always be to increase 
the strategy set of all players which facilitate an equilibrium point.  A Nash equilibrium being the 
optimal solution, a zero-knowledge strategy must necessarily produce a Nash equilibrium 
efficiently, with time being the only universal cost to any game-theoretic model.  The theorem of 
synthetic alternation proves a unique existence for boundary cases where an unknown outcome 
informs a synthetic a priori belief and synthetic a posteriori knowledge informing future 
decisions.  The doxastic expectation hinges on the belief that 𝐸 is likely, justified by the 
probability that 𝐹 is true.  This is a direct result of attenuated beliefs facilitated by the doxastic 
function discussed, which intersects the strategy set and non-empty set of decidable states.  
Formally, it is defined as the expression: 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸) ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ∩ Π𝑖(𝜔) 
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Ex ante being the stage in which any permissible communication should only define rules or the 
type of game, such a stage may allow certain forms of zero-knowledge signaling.  Such signaling 
restricted to setting rules may not contradict requirements that two competing agents not 
broadcast intentions as Nash states (Nash 1950).  The resulting ex interim is then a zero-
knowledge game focused on maximization of the strategy set as a sub-game of pure-coordination 
before a non-cooperative stage.  The Nash equilibrium is then an optimal, maximized utility 
while the outcome remains probabilistic and retains degrees of unknowability.  For instances 
where a player wishes to maximize their outcome at any expense of the opponent while 
simultaneously reducing risks, the opponent is then left to determine the level of information 
held by the greedy play and simultaneously adjust their doxastic expectations.  A method of 
adjusting doxastic expectation relies on the contingent probability of an event as supported by an 
encoding evidence, either leading to hard information to assist future strategy or epistemic 
knowledge provided via a past, opposing move. 
ℎ𝑘: 𝑥 ∈ 𝐸𝑥, 𝑃(ℎ𝑘|𝐸𝑥)
𝐹
⇒ 𝐾(𝐸) 
For the knowledge history ℎ𝑘 as a function of the predication of variables expressing a non-
empty set of information, the relative evidence as a contingent probability supporting the history 
ℎ𝑘 results in a justifiable assertion that the information constitutes knowledge.  This relationship 
is defined per the binary accessibility operator Φ(𝑥), as well as a theorem of zero-knowledge 
signaling as proven by Epsen (2006): 
Φ(𝑥) ⇒ 𝐾𝑖(𝐸) ≡ 1 − 2
𝑘+13−𝑘 
For fuzzy (𝐹, 𝐸), if there is some x such that, given the probability 𝑃(𝐸𝑥|𝐹𝑥) the following 
holds: ∃(𝑥){𝑥 | Φ(𝑥) ∩ Π𝑖(𝜔)}.  Given a knowledge history drawn from Epsen (2006) and using 
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an alternate form of the limit requirement for a zero-knowledge proof, ℎ𝑘 ≡ 1 − 2
𝑘+13−𝑘, with a 
probability threshold of approximately 1, then a zero-knowledge strategy (𝜎, 𝜏) with stage games 
(𝐺1, 𝐺2) signify a zero-knowledge proof.  For player strategies (𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆) and common 
knowledge 𝐾𝐶, the strategies may then produce a Nash equilibrium.  This equilibrium extends to 
continuous games allowing insufficient knowledge in the form of trivial sub-solutions, though 
the property may hold for both non-cooperative and pure-coordination games.  The equilibrium 
point as defined in Nash (1950) is contingent upon the n-tuple (𝑆) for every (𝑖) such that  
𝑃𝑖(𝑆) = ∀(𝑟𝑖){𝑟 | MAX(𝑟𝑖), [𝑃𝑖(𝑠; 𝑟𝑖]} 
Therefore, the equilibrium point is then necessarily a maximized payout for an agent 
when all other players’ moves are held at a fixed point (Nash 1950).  The result is that every 
strategy as employed against each agent is optimal (Nash 1950).  The necessary and sufficient 
condition for 𝑠 to stand as an equilibrium point given 𝑃𝑖𝛼(𝑠) = 𝑃𝑖(𝑠; Π𝑖𝛼), is defined by Nash 
(1950) as the equation: 
𝑃𝑖(𝑠) = MAX(𝛼), 𝑃𝑖𝛼(𝑠) 
Levin (2006) outlines conditions in terms of epistemic games for the existence of 
equilibrium points, structured around the set of states 𝜔 ∈ Ω and requiring the following 
conditions be addressed: 
• ℎ𝑖(𝜔 ⊂ Ω), for 𝑖’s knowledge in state 𝜔 
• 𝑠𝑖(𝜔) ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , for 𝑖’s pure strategy in state 𝜔 
• 𝜇𝑖(𝜔) ∈ ∆𝑆−𝑖 , for 𝑖’s soft information concerning the actions of others 
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These conditions for Nash equilibria given Bayesian players in state 𝜔, where each player knows 
the others’ actions, then results in 𝑠(𝜔) being a Nash equilibrium per Gantis (2009). For a 
linguistic fuzzy logic game (LFLG), the Nash equilibria may assume three values, two of which 
are distinct (Afri 2006).  These are constructed from a foundation within the continuum of 
linguistic interpretations and valuations, taking on values of semantic qualifiers treated as 
degrees of feasibility (Afri 2006).  The forms of Nash equilibrium possible are a result of a given 
player, 𝑖 ∈ [1,2], having a finite set of linguistic feasibility and nuance values symbolized as 𝜑 
and 𝑣 respectively (Afri 2006). 
The three forms of Nash equilibria are denoted as N-Nash Equilibrium (NNE), F-Nash 
Equilibrium (FNE), and F-N-Nash Equilibrium (FNNE) (Afri 2006).  The FNNE, as implied, is a 
conjunction of the NNE and FNE forms of equilibrium (Afri 2006).  Relative to a linguistic 
fuzzy logic game, Arfi demonstrated that a Nash equilibrium exists for all linguistic fuzzy logic 
models (Afri 2006).  Thus, given the linguistic feasibility values 𝜑𝑖
1 and the valuation function 𝑣𝑖
𝑙 
defining the linguistic fuzzy logic strategy:  
{ 𝜁(𝑠𝑖
𝑙𝑖) = 𝜁(𝑣𝑖
𝑙𝑖; 𝜑1
𝑙1) | 𝑖 ∈ [1,2]} ; 𝑙𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑞} 
The fuzzy strategy defined by Arfi (2006) requires satisfying conditions for Nash equilibrium.  
These conditions hold for the singular existence within the context of NNE and FNE equilibria, 
and must both be satisfied for the FNNE equilibrium (Afri 2006). The condition Arfi outlined for 
the NNE is formalized as (𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟; 𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ), provided the following is true for the partial ordering of 
valuations (Afri 2006): 
(𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ≺ 𝑣𝑙1∗𝑙2∗
∗𝑝𝑟) , ∀(𝑙1){1, … ,1 − 𝑙1
∗, 1 + 𝑙1
∗, … , 𝑞1} ;  ∀(𝑙2){1, … ,1 − 𝑙2
∗ , 1 + 𝑙2
∗ , … , 𝑞2}   
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The conditions for an FNE are similar per Arfi (2006), with the primary difference being 
a transition from 𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟
 to 𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟
, thus the FNE is treated as (𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ; 𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟) if (𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ≺ 𝜑𝑙1∗ 𝑙2∗
∗𝑝𝑟) insofar 
as the following holds: 
∀(𝑙1){1, … ,1 − 𝑙1
∗, 1 + 𝑙1
∗, … , 𝑞1} ;  ∀(𝑙2){1, … ,1 − 𝑙2
∗ , 1 + 𝑙2
∗ , … , 𝑞2} 
The equilibrium FNNE as proven by Arfi (2006) is then defined as the conjunction of the 
previous fuzzy equilibrium such that (𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟; 𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
∗𝑝𝑟) if (𝑣𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ≺ 𝑣𝑙1∗𝑙2∗
∗𝑝𝑟) and (𝜑𝑙1𝑙2
𝑝𝑟 ≺ 𝜑𝑙1∗ 𝑙2∗
∗𝑝𝑟) so long 
as the following holds: 
∀(𝑙1){1, … ,1 − 𝑙1
∗, 1 + 𝑙1
∗, … , 𝑞1} ;  ∀(𝑙2){1, … ,1 − 𝑙2
∗ , 1 + 𝑙2
∗ , … , 𝑞2} 
For imperfect recall of opponent’s moves, once a zero-knowledge proof satisfies the 
requirements for zero-knowledge signaling, the relative proposition 𝐾𝑛 becomes 𝐾𝐶(𝑠𝑖).  For 
competing coalitions, the knowledge is then subsumed within the opposing coalition insofar as 
the signaling coalition broadcasts the move as a form of public announcement.  At this point, 𝐾𝑛 
is absorbed in 𝑁 and 𝑆 such that future reference with imperfect recall treats (ℎ𝑘 , 𝐾𝑁) as a belief 
held by A and B, or the opposing coalition to the public signal. 
The theorem of synthetic alternation demonstrates the existence of boundary classes with 
respect to the truth of the predicates being evaluated.  When 𝑂𝑥 and 𝑆𝑥 are true, with 𝑅𝑥 being 
false, only the right-hand side of the theorem holds.  If only 𝑂𝑥 is false, the left-hand side of the 
theorem is true.  For both 𝑂𝑥 and 𝑅𝑥 being false, the right-hand side is true.  Applying this 
synthetic alternation operates as a function of probability given there may exist only one such 
object, subject, and relation.  Therefore, any zero-knowledge belief operating as a probabilistic 
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function as explained in Bledin (2007) is more readily verifiable.  The theorem itself is 
symbolized as: 
∃(𝑥){[((𝐸𝑥 → 𝑆𝑥) ∨ (𝑆𝑥 → 𝐸𝑥)) → ((𝐸𝑥 → 𝑆𝑥) → 𝐹𝑥)] ∨ [(𝐹𝑥 → (𝑆𝑥 → 𝐸𝑥))]} 
The point at which the verifier accepts the claim is dependent on both the number of times the 
verifier makes a request to the claimant in addition to the honesty of the claimant. 
The application of the theorem to the non-empty set of states Ω will now be 
demonstrated.  For a player 𝑖 with strategy 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆, belief or knowledge of 𝑥 ∈ ∆𝑋 treated as 
decidable information analyzes the decision element 𝐸𝑥 as evidence of 𝑥 given 𝐹𝑥 is likely true.  
Three states occur for (𝜔, 𝑥) ∈ Ω describing separate start states for decidability with respect to 
the stage of a game relative to previous moves.  The start state 𝑆0 is an exception, being possible 
irrespective of stages. 
 
 
  
If no knowledge of 𝐹𝑥 is directly accessible, a subject’s 
knowledge of 𝑥 may allow a strategic decision 𝑆𝑥 relying on 
𝐸𝑥 such that 𝐸𝑥 is assumed true.  Thus, 𝑃0 is a decision based on 𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝐸𝑥.  𝑉0 by contrast, allows 
the strategic move 𝑆𝑥 based on the proposition 𝐹𝑥, such that 𝐹𝑥 is assumed likely given a 
probabilistic threshold.  Thus, 𝑉0 is a decision model based on the plausibility of 𝐹𝑥.  𝑆0 is the 
initial state. 
State Sx Ex Fx 
𝑆0 T F F 
𝑃0 T T F 
 𝑉0 T F T 
𝑆0 - Initial Boundary Condition 
𝑃0 - Proposition Start State in Ω 
𝑉0 - Verification State in Ω 
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 Where 𝑆𝑥 is a subject’s knowledge of 𝑥, i.e. 𝐾𝑥𝑆 after application of absorption, 𝐸𝑥 is 
then encoded evidence of 𝑥 contingent upon the veracity of 𝑥 as justified by 𝐹𝑥.  The alternation 
theorem when generalized is thus translated as a unique existence of some evidence of 𝑥, that if 
true, allows the subject’s knowledge of 𝑥 to likewise be assumed true.  A subject’s true 
knowledge of 𝑥 then lends itself towards evidence supporting 𝑥.  With truth allowed in either 
direction, the feasibility of 𝑥 denoted as 𝐹𝑥 is then justifiable provided (𝑆𝑥, 𝐸𝑥) is inclusively 
true. 
 This inclusive truth of (𝑆𝑥, 𝐸𝑥) is defined as state 𝑉0.  If 𝐹𝑥 is false, only the right-hand 
side of the alternation is true.  This right-handed truth of the theorem is regarded as either 𝑆0 or 
𝑃0, if 𝐸𝑥 is true then 𝑃0 is allowed.  If (𝐸𝑥, 𝐹𝑥) are both false, only 𝑆0 is possible, provided 𝑆𝑥 is 
true.  For 𝑃0, the truth of 𝐸𝑥 is logically valid, thereby allowing 𝐸𝑥 to be knowable by agent 𝑖 in 
the strategic transition state 𝑆𝑥.  𝑃0 fails, or returns a REJECT when 𝐹𝑥 is false, continuing the 
process of analysis until either 𝐹𝑥 becomes true or until 𝐸𝑥 is discovered false.  For fuzzy 
(𝐹, 𝐸), if ∃(𝑥){𝑃(𝐸𝑥|𝐹𝑥) ⟹ 𝐵𝑖
𝐹𝑥(𝐸𝑥)} then the player may assume states (𝑆0, 𝑃0, 𝑉0).  To 
begin, let Bob move first. 
  
Bob (𝑠−𝑖) 
 
𝑞𝐼
0, 𝑞𝑈
0  
 
Alice (𝑠𝑖) 
(𝑆0, 𝑃0) 
(𝑆0, 𝑉0) 
 
𝑑1 
 
(𝑆0, 𝑃0) 
(𝑆0, 𝑉0) 
 
𝑑2 
 
  d1 
 
d0 
d2 
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The following diagram illustrates how the synthetic alternation facilitates decisions as a 
transition between states relying on incomplete information of previous moves.  Following from 
the previous diagram, the variables (𝑞𝐼
0, 𝑞𝑈
0 ) represent Alice’s belief that Bob is uninformed, 
denoted as 𝑞𝐼
0, and the probability that Bob is uninformed, denoted as 𝑞𝑈
0 .  Alice’s states, 
(𝑑1, 𝑑2) reflect the unknown component of which state she is deciding from.  Thus, the belief 
that Bob is uninformed is relative to his ability to perform the move 𝑑0.  Concepts of being 
uniformed relative to a move is a cornerstone of zero-knowledge signaling.  Thus, Alice enters a 
state where two decisions must be considered simultaneously.  By computing a doxastic 
interpretation, (𝐵𝑖
𝐹 ∈ 𝑑1, 𝑑2), and attenuating for knowledge 𝐾(𝐸), Alice uses the heuristic of ℎ𝑘 
as a transition function such that: 
 
 
[𝑑2] 
(𝑆0, 𝑉0) 
 
𝐾(𝐸) 
𝑃0
𝑑1 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸) 
𝑉0
𝑑1 
𝑑1 ↔ 𝑃0
1 𝑑1 
[𝑑1] 
(𝑆0, 𝑉0) 
 
𝐾(𝐸) 
𝑃0
𝑑2 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸) 
𝑉0
𝑑2 
𝑑2 ↔ 𝑃0
𝑑2 𝑑2 
𝑑1 𝑑2 
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This introduces the transition function 𝜆, which relies on conditions of belief as well as 
probabilistic knowledge resulting from imperfect recall of an opponent’s move.  This is formally 
expressed as: 
𝜆𝑛(ℎ𝑚) = {
𝐾(𝐸), ℎ𝑘 ≡ 1
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸),   otherwise
 
Thus, for the strategy 𝜆𝑛ℎ𝑚 the probability Bob is uninformed is contingent upon the history of 
his move, where a probability of 1 relative to the decision informs Alice’s belief that Bob is 
informed regardless of knowing his exact past move, or what state Alice is acting from.  This is 
expressed as the mapping function Θ(x) ⟼ Φ(x).  The result is that (𝜎, 𝜏) constitutes a zero-
knowledge proof per Epsen (2006) if, and only if: 
lim
𝑘⟶∞
𝑞𝐼 = lim
𝑘⟶∞
1 − 2𝑘+13−𝑘 = 1 
This constraint introduces the capability of mapping a belief onto the set of knowledge.  In this 
manner, the doxastic and epistemic endomorphism are defined as a bijection of (∆𝑆, ∆𝑋).  Thus, 
the Euclidean serial relation (𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑖) on 𝜔 with respect to 𝑣 is measurable for 𝐾𝑖 and 𝐵𝑖 .  The 
state space (𝑑1, 𝑑2) can be defined in matrix notation as the decision matrices Alice must 
transition from: 
𝑑1 = [𝑑2][𝑉0, 𝑃0], 𝑑2 = [𝑑1] [
𝑃0
𝑉0
] 
To attenuate the incomplete information from imperfect recall, as well as the approximate 
belief of Bob being uninformed, the variables of Bob being uninformed and being assumed as 
uninformed are defined as both doxastic and epistemic functions.  The following conditions and 
functions express these in terms of epistemic history of moves, and belief of opponent’s 
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knowledge.  To begin, Alice’s belief that Bob is uninformed is calculated by first determining 
whether Bob’s previous move may be classified as zero-knowledge signaling.  If Alice’s recall is 
imperfect, she then assumes the doxastic interpretation with respect to Bob’s being uninformed. 
𝑞𝐼: ℎ𝑘 = {
𝐾(𝐸),   ℎ𝑘 ≡ 1
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸),   otherwise
 
 If it is determined that Alice must assume some probabilistic level of Bob being 
uninformed, the next stage is then to determine the level of attenuation to lend towards Alice’s 
strategy.  This is determined as a condition of belief intersecting the set of non-empty states, and 
considering that Bob is perfectly informed otherwise.  The following conditions represent the 
probabilistic function that Bob is uninformed. 
𝑞𝑈: 𝐵𝑖
𝐹 = {
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸), 𝐵𝑖
𝐹𝑥(𝐸𝑥) ∩ Π𝑖(𝑤)
0, otherwise
 
 If it is found that the encoded evidence of a doxastic assumption is congruent to the recall 
permissible by Alice, the proposition is then treated in accordance with the state 𝑃0 which 
transitions Alice into the state space relative to 𝐹𝑥 being likely true.  The doxastic assessment in 
this stage is considered only when 𝐹𝑥 is found unlikely true given imperfect recall. 
ℎ𝑘(𝑃0) = {
1, 𝐹𝑥 ≡ ℎ𝑘
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸), otherwise
 
 If it is found that the proposition 𝑃0 as a function of Alice’s recall may be treated as 
likely true, Alice then transitions into the verification state 𝑉0.  The condition for doxastic 
verification given the encoded evidence and contingent truth of 𝐸 occurs as a consideration that 
Bob is informed, which then leads to analysis of whether Bob’s move satisfies the constraints of 
zero-knowledge signaling.  If it is determined by Alice that Bob’s move is in accordance with 
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zero-knowledge signaling, Alice then proceeds to assume Bob is justifiably informed.  If this is 
not the case then the evidence of 𝐸, treated as 𝐹𝑥, is regarded as likely false. 
𝐵𝑖
𝐹(𝐸, 𝑉0) = {
1 − 2𝑘+13−𝑘, 𝑞𝑈
0 = 0
¬𝐹𝑥, otherwise
 
The transition function with respect to states (𝑑1, 𝑑2) are treated as the zero-knowledge strategy 
𝜆, where 𝜆𝐴 = 𝑑1 and 𝜆
𝐵 = 𝑑2 are equivalent to the matrices: 
𝐴 = [𝑃0 𝑉0], 𝐵 = [
𝑉0
𝑃0
] 
The generalized form of the lambda strategy is treated via matrix multiplication to 
produce the zero-knowledge phase state.  The notation for lambda strategies may seem 
counterintuitive as a generalization, but rather than using the constants (𝐴, 𝐵) to denote the 
dimensionality of the zero-knowledge state the respective first-terms of the lambda matrices are 
used as a power of lambda.  By modifying the notation, the state-space is then adjusted to allow a 
universal applicability in regards to zero-knowledge signaling.  These are formalized in the 
following equivalences: 
𝜆𝑃 = [𝑃0 𝑉0] 
𝜆𝑉 = [
𝑉0
𝑃0
] 
𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑉 = [
𝑃0, 𝑉0 𝑃0, 𝑃0
𝑉0, 𝑉0 𝑉0, 𝑃0
] ≡ 𝑑1𝑑2 
𝜆𝑉𝜆𝑃 = [
𝑉0, 𝑃0 𝑉0, 𝑉0
𝑃0, 𝑃0 𝑃0, 𝑉0
] ≡ 𝑑2𝑑1 
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It is therefore trivial to see that the lambda transitions are ordered relationships between 
the elements of the matrices and their related states.  To compute whether the states accept or 
reject, one first begins by considering the opposing state as either 𝜆𝑃𝜆𝑉 = 𝜆𝐴(ℎ𝐵) or, 
alternatively, 𝜆𝑉𝜆𝑃 = 𝜆𝐵(ℎ𝐴).  The treatment of the lambda transitions can be optimized by 
noting that the ordered relationship is preserved under the complement of the lambda transition 
under consideration, and that the complement of either produce the opposing state. 
Returning to the sub-games of zero-knowledge signaling as defined by Epsen (2006), the 
requirement that Alice remains uninformed both as to Bob’s level of knowledge in conjunction 
with the incomplete information Alice possesses regarding which state she is deciding from 
remain satisfied.  This occurs given the lambda transitions remain functions of probability.  The 
primary difference between Epsen’s sub-games and the sub-games relying on lambda transitions 
are that, rather than a singleton variable 𝐗 the ordered pairs (𝑃0, 𝑉0) are substituted and 
instantiated using various permutations of the pair.  The substituted ordered pairs of (𝑃0, 𝑉0) are 
ignored when computing decidability of states (𝑑1, 𝑑2).  By focusing on the occurrences (𝑉0, 𝑉0) 
and (𝑃0, 𝑃0) within the theorem of synthetic alternation to determine whether the left-hand side 
holds given (𝑉0, 𝑉0), or the right-hand side for (𝑃0, 𝑃0) holds one must consider the predicates 
(𝐸𝑥, 𝑆𝑥, 𝐹𝑥). 
The process of eliminating choices to reach a decision based on zero-knowledge 
signaling through ignoring constants allows a player to conclude, from non-trivial signaling, 
which stage the player finds themselves.  This only occurs, as Epsen states, when an uninformed 
player attempts non-revealing strategies over an indefinite, finite time (Epsen 2006).  For zero-
knowledge strategies (𝑠 ∈ 𝜎, 𝑡 ∈ 𝜏), consider the states (𝑑1, 𝑑2) where: 
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𝑑1 = [𝑃0 𝑉0] ⟹ 𝑞𝑈
0  
𝑑2 = [
𝑉0
𝑃0
] ⟹ 𝑞𝐼
0 
Giving the benefit of the doubt, 𝑞𝐼
0, that 𝑞𝑈
0  is approximately zero any decision reflects the 
parallel processing of states (𝑑1, 𝑑2) where the lambda transition treats 𝑃0 as a congruence to the 
predicates (𝐸𝑥, 𝑆𝑥, 𝐹𝑥) such that: 
𝑃0 ≡ {
𝐸𝑥, True
𝑆𝑥, True
𝐹𝑥, False
 
This produces the ordered pair (𝑃0, 𝑉0) contingent upon the truth of 𝐸𝑥 given 𝐹𝑥 is true.  
The result is then the conditional statement 𝑃0 → 𝑉0.  To justify the epistemic soundness of 
existing in either state 𝑑1 or 𝑑2, knowledge of 𝑑1 allows inverse knowledge of 𝑑2.  Where 𝑑2 is 
the inverse of 𝑑1 drawing from (𝑞𝑈
0 , 𝑞𝐼
0), and 𝑉0 is treated independent of the truth-value of 𝐹𝑥.  
While 𝑉0 is investigated independent of 𝐹𝑥, 𝑃0 permits analysis of 𝐹𝑥 in determining the truth-
value of 𝐹𝑥.  The optimal choice remains (𝑃0, 𝑉0), followed by (𝑉0, 𝑃0) as the next optimal 
choice.  This reflects a bias and preference for decisions relying on epistemic soundness rather 
than a doxastic inference. 
Z X 
Y X 
𝑷𝟎, 𝑽𝟎 𝑷𝟎, 𝑷𝟎 
𝑽𝟎, 𝑽𝟎 𝑽𝟎, 𝑷𝟎 
𝑽𝟎, 𝑷𝟎 𝑽𝟎, 𝑽𝟎 
𝑷𝟎, 𝑷𝟎 𝑷𝟎, 𝑽𝟎 
X Y 
X Z 
𝐺1 𝐺2 
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Depending on whether columns are treated before rows, assuming the inverse of the 
lambda transition with respect to the incomplete information of game-staging allows isolation of 
the relative stage.  This occurs where Bob, having a probability of being uninformed 𝑃𝑈
0 as 
instantiated within the lambda transition then returns a value of knowledge history given 
signaling, as the condition {ℎ𝑘−1|𝑃0, 𝑃𝑈
0 < 𝑃𝐼
0}.  The doxastic interpretation of Bob’s move, as 
an approximate belief that Bob is assumed uninformed more so than he is, introduces an 
additional condition for Alice: 
{𝑃𝐼
0 | 𝑉0 ∩ Θ(𝑥),   𝑃𝐼
0 < 𝑃𝑈
0} 
To conclude the zero-knowledge model, the newly produced doxastic and epistemic 
predicates of Bob’s knowledge is treated as a set of ordered pairs derived from the models of 
sub-games (𝐺1, 𝐺2).  Thus, we now have: 
𝑃𝑈
0 = 0, if (P0, 𝑃0), tautology 
𝑃𝑈
0 = 0, if (V0, 𝑉0), tautology 
𝑃𝑈
0 = 0.5, if (V0, 𝑃0) and proof precedes evidence 
𝑃𝑈
0 = 0.5, if (P0, 𝑉0) and evidence precedes proof 
Therefore, analysis of history considering Bob’s move treated as zero-knowledge 
signaling results in the decidability of Alice’s next move structured upon an epistemic inference 
of which state she is in at that given moment.  This is formalized by treating the history as a 
function of the opposing player’s knowledge regarded as an inequality to justify Alice’s doxastic 
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analysis of Bob’s epistemic status relative to his move.  Given the function ℎ𝑘(𝑃0) as an 
implication of the inequality 𝑃𝑈
0 < 𝑃𝐼
0, one can then verify if ℎ𝑘 ≡ 1 − 2
𝑘+13−𝑘 is equal to 1. 
The strategies of (𝜎, 𝜏), if optimal and paired with 𝜆, constitute a zero-knowledge proof 
where (𝜎, 𝜏) are the only non-revealing strategies for Bob.  No revealing strategies are optimal, 
and all optimal strategies are non-revealing.  The final resulting state diagram reflecting the 
modification to Epsen (2006) is depicted in the following figure and formalizations.  Bob, having 
the level of knowledge 𝑞𝑈
0  given 𝑞𝑈
0 < 𝑞𝐼
0 produces history ℎ𝑘 ≡ 𝑑1, 𝑓(𝑃0) ↦ 𝑆𝑃
𝑥. 
Alice then enters a state-space within the 
inequality 𝑞𝐼
0 < 𝑞𝑈
0  and begins a doxastic 
interpretation Θ(𝑥) using the verification 
function 𝑓(𝑉0) → 𝑆𝑉
𝑥.  Relying on the inverse of 
each player’s strategy 𝑆, the resulting transition is 
symbolized as 𝑆𝑃
𝑥 = (𝑆𝑉
𝑥)−1 and 𝑆𝑉
𝑥 = (𝑆𝑃
𝑥)−1.  
We then substitute the elements of each matrix 
with respect to the complete state space, deriving 𝑆𝑃
𝑥 = [𝑃0 𝑉0] and 𝑆𝑉
𝑥 = [
𝑉0
𝑃0
].  With 
application of the lambda transition for the strategies (𝜎, 𝜏) as functions of the constant 
predicates 𝑆𝑖 = {
𝑓(𝑃0), 𝑞𝑈
0 < 𝑞𝐼
0
𝑓(𝑉0), 𝑞𝑈
0 < 𝑞𝐼
0 and defining the strategy functions as 𝑓(𝑃0): (𝑠 ∈ 𝜎) and 
𝑓(𝑉0): (𝑡 ∈ 𝜏).  Parallel consideration can then be given to the complete state space.  Both 
functions are elements of the lambda transition, and can now be formalized as ordered 
relationships with respect to Alice’s state space: 
𝜆𝑃(ℎ𝑉): 𝑑1𝑑2 = [
𝑃0𝑉0 𝑃0𝑃0
𝑉0𝑉0 𝑉0𝑃0
] 
𝑑0 
𝑑1 𝑑2 
Alice 
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𝜆𝑉(ℎ𝑃): 𝑑2𝑑1 = [
𝑉0𝑃0 𝑉0𝑉0
𝑃0𝑃0 𝑃0𝑉0
] 
 To verify the utility and feasibility of a zero-knowledge game model, the requirements 
for any solution to exist will be taken from Nash (1950).  To begin, every finite game has both an 
equilibrium point and a symmetric equilibrium point (Nash 1950).  Any 0 permutation of pure 
strategies likewise induces a permutation of players, resulting in each n-tuple of pure strategies 
inducing another, permuted n-tuple of pure strategies (Nash 1950).  The formal treatment of 
Nash’s theorem of pure permutations is symbolized as 𝜒 being the induced permutation of the n-
tuples while 𝑃𝑖(𝜉) is player 𝑖’s payoff when the n-tuple 𝜉 is made operational (Nash 1950).  For 
a permutation 𝜓 when 𝑗 = 𝑖𝜓, then 𝑃𝑗(𝜉
∗) = 𝑃𝑖(𝜉) which finalizes the notion of symmetric, pure 
strategy permutations (Nash 1950).  A unique linear extension to mixed strategies also occurs 
from the 0 permutation as stated by Nash (1950). 
This is demonstrated from the extension of 𝜒 to the n-tuples of mixed strategies as 
generated by the 0 permutation of mixed strategies (Nash 1950).  Given this finding, Nash 
demonstrates that a symmetric n-tuple 𝑠 of a game as shown for ∀(𝑥){𝑥|𝑠𝑥 = 𝑠} where 𝑋 is a 
derived permutation from the 0 symmetry then shows a unique linear extension exists (Nash 
1950).  Nash illustrated this for the case [𝑠𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝛼Π𝑖𝛼𝛼 ] for the term [𝑠
0 = ∑ 𝐶𝑖𝛼(Π𝑖𝛼)
0
𝛼 ] 
(Nash 1950).  Nash also shows that a game is solvable if the set of equilibrium points satisfy a 
specific condition, noted as the interchangeability condition (Nash 1950).  The solution is then 
the set 𝔖 of equilibrium points, provided (𝑡; 𝑟𝑖) ∈ 𝔖, and 𝓈 ∈ ℒ ⟹ (𝑠; 𝑟𝑖) ∈ ℒ for all 𝑖’s (Nash 
1950).  Thus, the set 𝔖 of equilibrium points is the solution of a solvable game (Nash 1950). 
For what Nash considered a strong solution, then the solution ℒ for all 𝑖’s must satisfy 
𝓈 ∈ ℒ, and the condition 𝑃𝑖(𝓈; 𝑟𝑖) = 𝑃𝑖(𝓈) ⟹ (𝑠; 𝑟𝑖) ∈ ℒ for the solution ℒ to be considered a 
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strong solution (Nash 1950).  For sub-solutions, given the subset ℒ as a subset of equilibrium 
points which satisfy the solvability constraint, ℒ is then considered maximal given solvability as 
a subset of equilibrium points. ℒ is thus a sub-solution (Nash 1950).  For the subset of 
equilibrium points ℒ, the set of all n-tuples must have membership with respect to the subset of 
equilibrium points such that each 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖
th factor set of ℒ for the n-tuples (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛) 
(Nash 1950).  Given these conditions, ℒ is then the product of its respective factor sets as stated 
by Nash (1950).  In consideration of the factor sets of ℒ, it is understood that the subsets of 
mixed strategy spaces are closed and convex, given the factor sets (𝑆1, 𝑆2, … , 𝑆𝑛) are the factor 
sets of the sub-solution ℒ (Nash 1950).  
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